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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 GUCCI AMERICA, INC. et al, Plaintiffs, 4 5 10 CV 4974 (RJS) V. 6 WEIXING LI, et al, 7 Defendants. 8 New York, N.Y. 9 June 3, 2011 2:30 p.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 12 District Judge 13 APPEARANCES 14 GIBSON DUNN 15 Attorneys for Plaintiffs NETRA SREEPRAKASH 16 ROBERT WEIGEL 17 ALLEN & OVERY Attorneys for Bank of China 18 ANDREW REYNARD LANIER SAPERSTEIN 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 (Case called)

(In open court)

THE COURT: This is Gucci America v. Weixing Li, docket number 10 CV 4975. Appearances, please?

MR. WEIGEL: Robert Weigel and Naptha Sreeprakash from Gibson Dunn & Crutcher for plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Mr. Weigel and Ms. Sreeprakash? I don't see you on the docket sheet, but maybe I missed it.

MS. SREEPRAKASH: I haven't submitted a notice of appearance in this particular action.

THE COURT: Let's do that so we have everybody who is working on this case on the docket.

MS. SREEPRAKASH: I will do that.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Lanier Saperstein of Allen & Overy for Bank of China today. I'm joined here today by my colleague Andrew Reynard who, too, will submit a notice of appearance.

THE COURT: Mr. Saperstein and Mr. Reynard. Good afternoon. I guess a lot of things are going on and have been going on. This is a case in which I previously issued a preliminary injunction which was extended to third parties, including Bank of China, and without going through all the details, a motion was made by plaintiff to compel Bank of China to produce confirmation and proof of the freezing of the defendant's assets and accounts consistent with the injunction, and then I got Bank of China's cross motion to modify the

preliminary injunction. That was all when White & Case was managing the case for Bank of China, right?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And then in the interim an amended complaint was filed naming additional defendants and an issue arose with respect to service, alternate service on those new defendants and, among other things, plaintiffs are seeking to have service effectuated through personal service on Bank of China's counsel and Bank of China's New York branch, though also publication in a Beijing newspaper and service upon the prior defendants with the direction that they forward the complaint and summons to the new defendants.

Let's start, I think, with the injunction. I've gotten some letters and things from the parties since. This is the first time I've seen you, Mr. Saperstein?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes.

THE COURT: You're still moving to modify the preliminary injunction?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Weigel, you're still moving to get them to show what they've done to comply with the injunction?

MR. WEIGEL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Seems we moved a little bit, but go ahead.

MR. WEIGEL: We also asked that they be required to produce the documents that were sought.

THE COURT: Under the injunction?

MR. WEIGEL: And also pursuant to the subpoena we served on them.

THE COURT: The parties have sent me as recently as a short time ago authority from New York State and others that relate to the separate entity doctrine. Do you want to talk about that, first?

MR. WEIGEL: Certainly. Or if you'd like to talk about the service we might be able to reach some sort of agreement on that.

THE COURT: Well, wait. We might be able to reach an agreement on what?

MR. WEIGEL: Well, what we've figured out, your Honor, is that unlike in most of these cases where when we shut down the website there's no longer an active e-mail address because the e-mail address was sort of part of the website, the administrator for these websites, according to Network Solutions, which was the host, the contacts are two Yahoo addresses. So those e-mail addresses are live e-mail addresses. We've served things on them. They've not bounced back.

So I've spoken to Mr. Saperstein, and they, leaving aside the question whether they remain standing, they certainly don't care how we serve these folks.

THE COURT: As long as it's not through them.

MR. WEIGEL: As long as it's not through them. So if your Honor found it acceptable, and I think it would be --

THE COURT: So this is a new alternate service?

MR. WEIGEL: It was part of serving the other defendants. What we didn't realize when we did that, we both physically served the other defendants at that time and we served this e-mail address and this e-mail is, as far as we know, still a good e-mail address. E-mails to it do not bounce back.

THE COURT: What is the basis for concluding that this e-mail address is connected to the new defendants?

MR. WEIGEL: The new defendants were all part of this -- as alleged in the complaint -- are part of the same scheme to sell fake Gucci purses through the internet. These folks all collectively I think received almost \$500,000 into their accounts at the Bank of China out of the proceeds of the account that the proceeds, the counterfeit sales were dumped into. So what would happen would be, they would sell a purse on the internet, they would process the credit card sale through an operation called Frontline out of Montana. They would deposit the account in a Chase, the money in a Chase Bank account and then the existing defendants would wire that money to these folks in China.

So at this point I think that it would be a fair assumption that these new defendants know that this lawsuit

exists because, first off, they've stopped receiving the money they were getting. Their colleagues who were sending the money certainly were served with the complaint, and --

THE COURT: The other defendants you mean?

MR. WEIGEL: The other defendants. And, and perhaps this is wishful thinking on my part, but the Bank of China froze their accounts, in which case --

THE COURT: Do you know that or you're hoping that that's --

MR. WEIGEL: I'm hoping that's in line with your Honor's order, but whether they did or didn't, they certainly stopped receiving funds for the counterfeits through this website.

We know that this website address this, e-mail address, this Yahoo address was used by the persons who set up this website and since these people received the proceeds from the sales from the websites, I think it's a fair inference and a means calculated to give them notice to send the amended complaint to these two Yahoo addresses. And we could also follow it up if your Honor thought appropriate with personal service on the existing defendants.

THE COURT: And then also you're talking about the newspaper.

MR. WEIGEL: And we could publish, too, if your Honor -- the publication is a blunt tool, but it's a

1 | well-accepted tool.

THE COURT: And when there's nothing else you can do, that's sometimes the best can you do. That's really the inquiry, what's the best you can do that's reasonably designed to give notice to the parties, to the defendant.

MR. WEIGEL: And I believe that Mr. Saperstein does not have any objection to any of that.

THE COURT: You don't have a dog in that fight, is that right?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: That's right, your Honor. I only want to make sure that my client is not put in a position where it has to violate Chinese law. So if it doesn't involve Bank of China, then, no, I don't have a dog in that fight.

THE COURT: Let's play that out. Mr. Weigel is deemed to have served these other defendants, these other defendants don't respond, don't show up, default judgment. What's next, then?

MR. WEIGEL: Well, then what would happen, we would move for -- and we may have to do it by a separate proceeding or we'd move in this proceeding for a turnover order to the Bank of China requiring them to turn over the proceeds of that account to -- the various accounts to us. So we're not going to avoid our fight completely, but we're just going to avoid our fight as to this service issue.

THE COURT: That was an avoidable fight and that was

one of my questions to you. Not based on the e-mail address, but just on the first two methods of service, that would be one way to avoid it. I think it would be kind of a big deal, certainly new ground I think being broken to allow service the way you propose with respect to Bank of China. I'm not saying that's a reason not to do it, but the others would be less controversial.

So what does that mean for the other motion you've got kicking, which is the motion to compel Bank of China to confirm that they've been complying with the injunction and to produce the documents ordered by the injunction?

MR. WEIGEL: That still stands, your Honor.

THE COURT: So we fight that today or we fight that another day after you get your turnover order?

MR. WEIGEL: I'm happy to fight that today, your

Honor. I'd like to get that resolved, because we'd like to get

the documents so that we could pursue these folks, because they

may have other bank accounts.

THE COURT: So that's what I mean. So we're not avoiding that fight today.

MR. WEIGEL: Not at all, your Honor, just the service one.

THE COURT: I was going to do service second, but we can do it first. Doesn't sound like we need to fight about that. The only thing I think I need is a tighter understanding

with respect to the e-mail address and to why it's reasonable to conclude that that e-mail address is going to lead to or result in notice to the defendants. Have you written that out someplace?

MR. WEIGEL: I'm not sure I have, your Honor. I could certainly speak to it.

THE COURT: Does that sound familiar to you? No. I was wondering if just a short affidavit would allow me to pass on it in a more thorough way than we have?

MR. WEIGEL: Certainly. We'll submit that first thing next week, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine. I'm inclined to grant the motion for alternate means of service? What are you going to do otherwise. It seems to me there's just no remedy whatsoever.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, I just want to be clear that your granting of the motion is with respect to points one and two.

THE COURT: One and two, and now four.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Okay.

THE COURT: I'm going to punt on three. I could resolve three if I need to, but I think until I've heard some more argument, that would be an uphill climb for Mr. Weigel, and maybe we want to avoid that one for now.

MR. WEIGEL: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's now go back to the motions that I was going to talk to first, the motion relating to confirming proof of freezing the assets and the production of documents and Bank of China's cross motion to modify the preliminary injunction to relieve them of those obligations.

There's a lot of talk about the May New York case, Judge Solomon's case, Samsung Logics, right.

MR. WEIGEL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I've seen a lot of you guys writing about it back and forth. So your letter, which was June 1 --

MR. WEIGEL: Yes, and a letter just today from Mr. Saperstein.

THE COURT: Yes, I have it. You distinguish this case because you're saying that case involved a Korean judgment creditor seeking to enforce a British judgment, this is a Chinese judgment debtor and a Chinese bank where there is no New York connection, which may be true. But does that matter for purposes of what's going on here? New York has probably a policy of enforcing judgments in arbitrations, and so does it really turn on just how much New York interests are implicated by the arbitration and that's what distinguishes this Judge Solomon case from this case, from the case before me?

MR. WEIGEL: Honestly, your Honor, my personal feeling is that Judge Solomon was -- her decision is wrong and it is in conflict with other judgments such as the Commerce Bank

decision.

THE COURT: It's not entitled to tremendous weight.

That's not slapping at her or her reasoning, necessarily.

She's not the Court of Appeals, that's for sure.

MR. WEIGEL: But in any event, what she said in that case was that that case went beyond the -- she said that case went beyond what the Bank of Bermuda case said, and our case and the reason we distinguished them the way we did is that our case is actually narrower and more New York focused than what happened in the Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda case.

The dissent in the Koehler case complained and it seemed to be what Judge Solomon picked up on, complained that this could mean that New York would be the center of the universe for people trying to collect judgments. And that was rejected by the Court of Appeals.

But in our case we're not going nearly so far. In

Koehler it was a Maryland judgment against a defendant, neither

the plaintiff or defendant had anything to do with New York and

the Court of Appeals held because the Bank of Bermuda was here,

you could come to New York, domesticate your judgment from

Maryland and make Bank of Bermuda bring assets into New York.

Judge Solomon said that what the plaintiffs in her case was trying to do was broader than even what the Court of Appeals allowed. In our case what we're trying to do is narrower than what the Court has allowed, because here the

plaintiff is in New York, the defendants are all subject to personal jurisdiction in New York and the Bank of China is here. So there's no question of forum shopping. None of the concerns that were raised in the dissent to the Koehler case apply here.

But all that being said, Judge Castel in the Commerce Bank case allowed an Oklahoma judgment to be domesticated in New York, serve upon Commerce Bank, and that that was sufficient to restrain an account in Germany by Commerce Bank. A similar result was reached in a Wachovia case in the Eastern District by -- it was a magistrate judge, his name escapes me right now -- but also held that serving Wachovia in New York was sufficient to restrain an account in Florida.

So there really doesn't seem to be much argument that this Court has the power. The Koehler case was quite plain.

THE COURT: Does it matter, though? I don't know about Florida, other states and their bank secrecy law, isn't there a concern that China has a different bank secrecy law than the U.S., typically, that puts folks like the Bank of China between a rock and a hard place? Isn't that a legitimate concern?

MR. WEIGEL: Well, it is one of the factors that is to be considered, your Honor.

THE COURT: But it wasn't a factor that really was at play in the cases you've just cited, right?

MR. WEIGEL: No, but we're actually arguing, right now, you and I, the case we're going to bring when we get judgment. What we're asking for right now is whether or not this Court has the power to restrain the defendants from accessing these accounts. The answer I don't think anybody can say is in dispute, it's the case, and the First Department in the Abuhamda case restrained a bank account in Jordan. They said we're not doing an attachment here, we're just saying you can't touch it, and they prevented the bank and the defendant from releasing those funds. That was the First Department. It was an injunction, it wasn't an attachment and it wasn't a turnover order. It was prejudgment and the First Department said not a problem and we don't, frankly, understand why the bank had a dog in the fight.

THE COURT: But this is a little broader, this injunction, right?

MR. WEIGEL: What we're asking for --

THE COURT: Freezing the assets is one thing. You're asking for freezing of the assets and the production of documents, some of which might run afoul of China bank secrecy laws, correct?

MR. WEIGEL: They claim that that is the case, but we have found, I believe, three different actions, the most recent being in November in front of Judge McKenna who was affirming Magistrate Judge Francis where the Bank of China was actually

ordered to produce documents, and they have yet to produce any evidence that they were in any way adversely impacted by having done that. And if you look at, it's the case of Milliken v.

Bank of China. It rejected -- Judge Francis went through the restatement factors and rejected China's argument, held that they --

THE COURT: But don't I have to do the same here, or you're saying I don't have to do that?

MR. WEIGEL: No, no. I believe your Honor does have to go through the restatement factors here. But you asked about the bank secrecy and I'm saying when you look at the fact that they produced in that case, they produced in a case called Non-Ferrous DM Corp. v. Daniel Karren (ph) in the Southern District where they were ordered to produce documents, and the DOC v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance, a 2004 case, in this court where they were also compelled.

THE COURT: Compelled to produce documents?

MR. WEIGEL: And interrogatory responses.

THE COURT: Pursuant to an injunction or that's a subpoena?

MR. WEIGEL: I think it's a subpoena, your Honor. And in all three of those cases they produced documents. They also produced documents in another case brought by Gucci and there's a public filing on the record indicating they are going to produce the documents and they have not produced anything other

than generalized statements that they may possibly be harmed by this. They have done it multiple times and they have not been subject to sanctions.

THE COURT: What's the other Gucci case here in Southern District?

MR. WEIGEL: My Replica Handbags. And what happened in that case, a very similar case --

THE COURT: Who was it before?

MR. WEIGEL: It was Judge Koeltl, I believe. What happened — there's no reported decision in that case. What happened is we got the same sort of injunction your Honor issued here. We served it on Bank of China. They came into Court, said we can't restrain these things, we put them on administrative hold.

We then got a judgment. The judgment directed them to turn over the assets. They then said, oh, we released the account several months back. We made a motion for contempt. That was settled. It had a provision in it that was confidential, but allowed for us to disclose it in order to enforce.

THE COURT: Are you allowed to disclose it now?

MR. WEIGEL: I am because it's on the public record,

your Honor. What happened was we then made a second motion to

compel because they had not produced the documents that were

required to be produced. At the end of the day they filed a

status report on the record saying that they are producing the documents, and the case settled after that.

So I'm bringing it up for the point that they've produced documents --

THE COURT: But nobody is going to jail in China because of this.

MR. WEIGEL: No one has gone so jail. There's no specific instance of anybody having any problem.

THE COURT: Maybe it's good to hear from

Mr. Saperstein on this, then I'll hear from you again. But

since we had a train of thought, you mentioned a bunch of cases

and have asserted that the bank secrecy laws in China are

really more of a red herring, certainly not something they can

specifically support the relief that's being sought by Bank of

China. It may be significant for you to respond to it,

Mr. Saperstein.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes, your Honor. I'm happy to respond to it, then perhaps I can touch upon the separate entity issue as well.

Your Honor, Bank of China alleges that the bank secrecy laws are a paper tiger.

THE COURT: I think that's exactly what you said. You allege. Somebody used it in the letter.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: I used that, your Honor, because that's essentially what they're saying. We have submitted two

expert affidavits by Professor Wu, as well as Professor

Feinerman confirming that, one, Bank of China does have those

bank secrecy laws and plaintiff does not contest otherwise, and

second of all, there are examples and instances of banks,

including Bank of China, being subject to liability for

violating or allegedly violating those regulations.

THE COURT: What about the ones that have been mentioned now by Mr. Weigel?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Turning to the Milliken case. I think if anything the Milliken case is helpful to us. If I may, I'll give you a brief bit of background on the Milliken case. That, the Milliken served a turnover position — by way of background. Milliken had a copyright infringement action against certain defendants. They brought an action in China and obtained preliminary relief in China against the alleged infringer. Then they got a — they bought a second suit in Nevada and obtained a default judgment there. Then they brought an action for enforcement in Florida and were actively litigating that matter against the judgment debtors.

Then Milliken brought another action three weeks after Koehler in New York and served a turnover petition on the Bank of China. The Bank of China in that action filed an answer asserting an affirmative defense. Plaintiff said produce the documents, and initially the bank said they refused. Then the Court said if you're going to rely on the affirmative defense

you need to produce the documents.

That's not what we have here. In fact, in the decision that Magistrate Judge Francis issued, he says, which is I think perfectly on point here, "it's one thing to require a party bringing a claim to resort to the Hague evidence convention procedures in order to obtain evidence from another entity necessary to support that claim."

The Court goes on to say, "It's a different matter to submit a party to decline to disclose information when they're trying to rely on that for an affirmative defense."

So Magistrate Judge France opinion there specifically says that when you're a non-party that is not asserting a claim, as the Bank of China is here, that it is perfectly reasonable to make the claimant resort to the Hague evidence convention.

Second of all, with respect to the documents, after the motion was decided, the Bank of China made documents available, but they had customer consent and a very different issue is that the judgment debtor was present and actively litigating with the plaintiff Milliken. They litigated in China, they were actively litigating in Florida, and so there the judgment debtors were present. Very different from here. So the judgment debtors were present and the bank got consent from the customer to release the documents.

That's not -- we don't have that here, your Honor. We

don't have customer consent to release the documents.

Ultimately in Milliken what happened was, the petitioner,

Milliken, settled the action with the judgment debtors, so that

case was dismissed, the turnover petition against the bank was

dismissed ultimately because Milliken and the judgment debtor

had settled.

We don't have that here, your Honor. We don't have the alleged customers of the bank present and available to give consent to release documents.

THE COURT: But, I mean, that's true, I don't think there's any dispute about that, but isn't it kind of perverse that the folks who don't show up at all for whom there is jurisdiction and a judgment has been entered against them, get to, sort of get the benefit of all the bank secrecy laws and all the protections that you're talking about? Leaving the plaintiff here basically without a wagon, right? What are they supposed to do?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, I think there's a solution.

THE COURT: Tell me the solution.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: The solution here is that plaintiffs can submit -- should go through the Hague evidence convention.

I have offered --

THE COURT: Does that ever work?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, we have submitted

evidence in two letters. One on May 19 and one earlier today, in which the Ministry of Justice confirms that they have and will on a Hague Convention request for evidence located in China. Now, Mr. Weigel said when we were before you on January 25 that going through the Hague Convention, Judge, is futile. Right?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: In the most recent submission on June 1, you'll note that the tenor has changed. It is no longer futile, it's, well, it takes a long time.

THE COURT: Taking a long time would not be futile if in fact it turns out that Bank of China has frozen the assets, right? But if they haven't, futility seems assured. And I have to guess whether or not you've frozen the assets?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, look, I mean, I don't think the Bank of China has been perfectly clear here on what the law is in China. The law in China prohibits the freeing of a customer's assets based on foreign process. We've said that to the Court many times and we submitted expert affidavits to that effect. That's what I can tell the Court. But this is about documents, and the question is, the question is, how do they get the documents they purportedly need?

THE COURT: Well, it's about documents and it's about other things. So maybe we should focus on the things where maybe we can get someplace, because I don't think you're going

to budge on documents. What about confirming that the assets have been seized? Is that something the Bank of China can do?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: If I could stick on documents for one second? I just want to close the loop here, if I can.

We are prepared to work with plaintiffs. One, I offered to draft the Hague evidence convention request for them for their review and we have offered to work with them to file it with your Honor and submit, if we could do so, a letter or affidavit, or some submission to the Chinese authorities saying we've agreed with this request.

THE COURT: That might be a reasonable thing to do if you know at the end of the day there are assets you're going to get. There still might be problems with it, but I guess why not, what is restraining the Bank of China from confirming that they have seized the assets or they have at least complied with the preliminary injunction as far as the assets are concerned?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, again, all I can say -- what I can say is I know the Bank of China has informed the Court of the restrictions that apply under Chinese law.

THE COURT: All right. What you're suggesting is that you'll help write the Hague Convention requests, you'll be there side by side with Mr. Weigel and then at the end of the day maybe there will be some assets there and maybe there won't be, and if they aren't, then we'll know it was futile and two years from now we'll know what to do next time?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I don't know. I'm being a little facetious, but this makes sense only if you're prepared to wink and nod in such a way to make it clear there's an advantage to doing it this way. Otherwise, I don't blame Mr. Weigel for saying we need to do better than this.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, presumably we would encounter the same issue whether you order documents to go through the Hague Convention or order the bank to release documents in response to a Rule 45 subpoena.

THE COURT: I think Mr. Weigel has two main goals here. One is to make sure at the end of the day he gets assets. The other is to give him access to information that would allow him to pursue a trail while it's hot. Hot at this point being relative. At this point it's a pretty cold corpse, I imagine. So I'm not sure what you propose satisfies the second objective, but it might make sense for the first if the Bank of China has frozen assets, but you're not in a position to let us know whether that's true, so we just have to hope and cross our fingers.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: I think there are two responses to that, your Honor. First of all, the trail is, to use your term, perhaps cold because we have been fighting with them since July.

THE COURT: I think Mr. Weigel wants to win this one

now so the next time he has a warm body.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: I would say, your Honor, maybe the thing to do, we've offered this many times to Mr. Weigel, it's unclear to me why he won't go on parallel tracks; one, go through the Hague Convention and pursue his motion. I have offered to go on parallel tracks and Mr. Weigel has not been inclined to do that. I'm unclear why. I suspect, your Honor, Mr. Weigel doesn't want the Hague Convention process to be successful because that would mean he would have to go through it. It's particularly unfair, given the fact the bank is put in a very unfair position where it has bank secrecy laws to comply with. At one point Mr. Weigel said I don't see why Bank of China is raising an issue here. The Bank of China is raising an issue here because it's caught in a difficult position.

THE COURT: I understand the difficult position of Bank of China. I think it's unclear as to how difficult a position, whether it's really between a rock and a hard place or it's as Mr. Weigel suggests, nobody is going to jail for this. I understand your expert's report and I understand what you're saying on this. Everyone would have to understand it's a difficult position for anyone to be in, that they have to comply with a Court order in New York or run the risk of violating a law in China. Nobody wants to be in that situation. And ideally you're right, this is what conventions

and governments are for. They are designed to sort of deal with these problems, because ultimately they're international problems involving governments.

But the law is such that Courts actually get to make decisions on this kind of thing, so I don't have to wait for the State Department to negotiate the next deal. I can by applying the framework that's been handed to me by the Court of Appeals actually give Mr. Weigel what he wants, right? Even if it looks like you're going to be caught between a rock and a hard place. The issue is how hard is that hard place.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, you're right, and I would posit and support my evidence from the experts that it's a hard place indeed.

The second reason why, you mentioned the futility argument with respect to the documents. You mentioned Mr. Weigel is interested in following the money, I believe.

THE COURT: I think he is. I assume that's what motivates him. He looks like a materialistic person. He dresses better than I do, let's put it that way. So do you, Mr. Saperstein.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: You're very kind, your Honor, thank you. That made my day.

THE COURT: The bar is pretty low here.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: I will still take it.

I think the documents will be useful also for

following the money. If, for example, Mr. Weigel wants to follow the money from, let's say it went from Bank of China, assuming it did, to somewhere else, the documents could show that. If that's what he's interested in, following the money, the documents could show that, and if he wants to go to the person who ultimately has the money or ultimately is responsible for the purported infringing the documents could help him do that in terms of a trail. So I'm not sure seeking documents would be futile.

Now, I certainly do think that if we had done this a while ago, gone through the Hague Convention, even at the same time we pursued the motion, we would be a lot further along than we are now.

THE COURT: No question about that. Mr. Weigel you have a handle on this, though maybe the facts have changed since you started. Maybe China is warming up to these reviews since it started to deal with this problem. The State Department seems to thinks so.

MR. WEIGEL: The State Department took it out. The State Department has many issues with China and they didn't give a clue, didn't say anything to suggest that the situation had improved, they simply took it out. We attached to one of our letters an ADA study which said that the Peking court, which processes approximately 1 per year, and even under their analysis they say that 50 percent of them get declined over the

course of six to twelve months.

So it really is not -- it is true, your Honor, that when your Honor ordered that they produce the documents in ten days that I didn't think almost a year later they wouldn't have produced the documents. But the Second Circuit has set forth a number of criteria as to when you can judge how important the government's interest is, and one of them is when it depends on the consent of the depositor, then that's not a very strong government interest because it's not a situation where, like Switzerland, where you can't release the information under any basis. The Second Circuit has said that when the depositor or when the customer can waive the privilege, it's not a very strong concern of in this case the Chinese.

Second, the Chinese government has not come in here and submitted anything.

THE COURT: Hold on. You're arguing the merits of the motion, and I understand that. But I don't think you're responding to Mr. Saperstein's point, which is why not give the Hague Convention a try? And I think what you're saying is that nothing really has changed since January, right?

MR. WEIGEL: Nothing has really changed since January. It's an added expense. This is an action that was brought in New York for sales in New York. The Bank of China, while between a rock and a hard place, has put themselves in that place and in fact, and Mr. Saperstein and I go around and we do

this on Monday we're in Judge Pitman's courtroom doing the same thing because they are the recipient of the proceeds of a very large amount of the counterfeits that are sold here and the only way that the counterfeiter's model works where they kind of hide behind the fog in China is if they have a conduit to get the money, U.S. dollars.

THE COURT: I get all that. The other concern, and this is what governments exist for, is to weigh what are the costs of Bank of China just then getting out of New York, because that could have a detrimental effect on other players in a big economy, right? So I understand what you're saying. I think there's a lot to what you say there. It's frustrating.

MR. WEIGEL: U.S. banks produce Lord knows how many of these Chase deals in a given week and why should the Bank of China have some sort of competitive advantage that counterfeiters can use their bank and shield their assets, whereas if they had people doing banking with Chase, Chase would turn it over?

THE COURT: I think the reason is because China is a sovereign country and China gets to enact its own laws with respect to what's required of its banks in China. This is not a new problem. This is kicking around for a while. Congress could fix it if they wanted to, right, by just saying we're not going to allow this to happen, we recognize China is a safe haven for fraudsters on a massive scale and we're not going to

stand for their bank secrecy laws during which fraudsters operate.

MR. WEIGEL: The Second Circuit already decided this, your Honor, in 1959 I think again in another First National City case where again they said if a bank has problems complying with two different sovereigns, that's the bank's choice in having chosen to operate in two different companies under two different sovereigns, and if they can't do both, then they have to surrender to one or the other.

THE COURT: We have a convention, right? There is a convention that is recognized, that the U.S. is on board with, that this is acceptable. This is an acceptable way for multinational entities or entities with offices in different countries to be able to function. That's their general running rule.

MR. WEIGEL: There is clearly a convention and the Supreme Court has said, I think it's the Aerospatiale case, that it's not mandatory and in this circumstance where there's only a 50 percent chance that in six to twelve months we might gain information —

THE COURT: Do you think it's that high?

MR. WEIGEL: No, I don't. But that's what their statistics say. That's what they say as it's gotten better. Now you have half of a 50 percent chance that in six to twelve months we might get something, that this is just not an

effective remedy here.

THE COURT: Look, I understand your arguments. I've been sympathetic to them and I don't think, I mean, this is lost on me. I wanted to give Mr. Saperstein an opportunity to respond to you on some of the other cases that you mentioned. So he's responded with respect to two; Judge Francis' decision and the one Judge McKenna adopted. What about the Judge Castel case?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, that goes to the separate entity. I wanted to finish up with the documents. Your Honor said things have changed since January, the answer is yes. We now have more information than we did in January. First is the State Department website on which the plaintiffs relied very heavily on in their papers has been revised. Previously the State Department said it was very uncertain, difficult and unlikely to go to the Hague Convention. That language was specifically struck from the web site.

THE COURT: Any idea why? You say it supports an inference that it no longer is dire or discouraging as it once was. Conceivably it could be that the portion of the language that said while it is possible to request compulsion, was deemed to be overstating, because it's barely probable now. So I don't know, is there something else on the website or in State Department literature that suggests that things really are getting better?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: There's the evidence that we have for the Chinese Ministry of Justice, but in answer to your question do I know why they revised it, I called the State Department to find out to speak to them about this. They told me when I asked them if I could quote them in an affidavit and they said I couldn't unless I did it by way of Touhy requests.

THE COURT: Got it. That's even slower than Hague Convention.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: I feared I would not have it in time for the hearing, your Honor. What I was told -- and if the Court wants me to submit Touhy requests to the State Department so they could put their opinions in writing -- I was told it was outdated. That's the specific term I was told. I was told that the State Department encourages people to go through the Hague Convention. That's what I was told.

As to evidence, your Honor, we have two pieces of evidence. And it's not, as Mr. Weigel says, my evidence, it is from Ministry of Justice.

THE COURT: The ILCC thing.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Right, which channels Hague

Convention requests. There are two pieces of information.

They have informed us that on average they have honored

50 percent of the requests for documents.

THE COURT: Mr. Weigel was alluding to that a moment ago.

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MR. SAPERSTEIN: And it's executed within a six-to-twelve-month period. Now, I don't know about what 50 percent, the ones that were not honored or may still be pending, I don't know if they were overly broad, I don't know what those were, but certainly 50 percent is not futile.

Second of all, we would be prepared to work with Mr. Weigel to assure that a Convention request, we would do our best to make sure that it is honored, and third of all, your Honor, the numbers are pretty consistent with other countries. And that's what we submitted by way in our letter today. Mr. Weigel may say he doesn't like the Hague Convention as a matter of policy. Okay, but it is a treaty that's in place and parties do go through it and courts have required parties to go through it. For example, we appended as Exhibit D to our letter of today that there's a summary of Hague Convention requests by responding countries and the average time for executing a letter request is about six months. Of the 936 letters of request reported by responding nations to be served in 2007, 216 were executed in the six-to-twelve-month period, which is the single largest amount for any time period. the most artful sentence, but certainly that was the most for any given time period.

So China is right in the thick of it. China is not a rogue country here. It's not an outlier. It's in the thick of it in terms of honoring a Hague Convention request. I give the

1 numbers for the UK --2 THE COURT: This is all in Exhibit D? 3 MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes, your Honor, Exhibit D. 4 THE COURT: As I said, I skimmed this. I looked at 5 the letter, I didn't look at the attachment. 6 MR. SAPERSTEIN: It's a mere 54 pages to the 7 attachment, your Honor. I figured I should give you the whole document rather than the table. 8 9 THE COURT: Fine. I'm just saying I haven't looked at 10 it. But this is what you're referring to, data in Exhibit D, 11 which is the HCCH report. 12 MR. SAPERSTEIN: Precisely, your Honor. Then I also 13 recite the numbers for the UK. And in 2007 the UK executed 36 14 letters, 15 of which were executed in the six-to-twelve-month period, and so as to the rate of execution, the UK received 123 15 letter requests, 87 of which were returned unexecuted or were 16 17 still pending as of December. 18 THE COURT: Well, they're a rogue country, too. that why you're here? 19 20 MR. SAPERSTEIN: Indeed it is, your Honor. 21 So China -- it's not futile, and China is in the thick 22 of it in terms of honoring Hague Convention requests and we 23 will certainly work with the plaintiffs to submit a Haque

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THE COURT: But just so we're all clear, this is a

Convention request, your Honor.

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Hague -- what we're really talking about here and I think what Exhibit D refers to is requests for documents, right?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: You keep resisting -- I think I understand why. You keep resisting a request for documents. You keep making a distinction between a request for documents and -- let me rephrase. You're making no distinction between a request for documents and a request for some sort of confirmation of compliance with the preliminary injunction as it applies to the seizing of the assets. Right now Mr. Weigel doesn't know whether the assets have been seized and you're suggesting you can't consistent with bank secrecy laws in China confirm or deny that, correct?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: The law is as we stated in our expert declarations, your Honor, and that is what I'm able to say.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, turning to the cases that Mr. Weigel cited, he cited some in the separate entity context and some in the document context and I'll just finish off in the document context, if I may. Mr. Weigel cited the Milliken case, we discussed that. He also mentioned the prior Gucci case.

THE COURT: Yes, the one before Judge Koeltl.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Yes, versus MyReplicaBag.com.

Perhaps the case is illustrative for why plaintiffs are here

again. The upshot of that case was Bank of China ended up settling that case for \$500,000, which went to Mr. Weigel's firm and to him.

Now, what happened there was defendant had appeared in that litigation. Defendant has entered into and approved a temporary restraining order. Part of that temporary restraining order was consent to produce documents. So Bank of China had a defendant who had appeared and had consented to the release of his documents. We don't have that here.

Now, there is — there was some issue of was the consent sufficient for purposes of Bank of China. I agree with that. There was to and fro. What ultimately happened in that case was the documents were made available at counsel's office, and one of Mr. Weigel's colleagues came over and got to look at them. When Mr. Weigel started to press for more, the bank ultimately sent them. The bank had customer consent to send the documents, but when Mr. Weigel started increasing his pressure and increasing his demands, the bank ultimately settled for \$500,000. Maybe that's why Mr. Weigel is here again, I don't know.

But to say there's no harm to the bank when they paid \$500,000 to Mr. Weigel, I think is not true. So I think if anything, if anything, the Gucci case shows that the bank is in potential jeopardy here.

THE COURT: It's not clear to me why them paying

\$500,000, and I don't know whose money it was, theirs or their account holders, but that doesn't speak to whether or not they got in trouble in China for doing this.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: They had customer consent, your Honor.

THE COURT: So they didn't get in trouble in China.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: I don't know the answer to that question. I do not know the answer to that question.

THE COURT: I think all these cases are factually distinguishable and ultimately these determinations turn on the facts. I get that. But it does seem as though there certainly are enough instances in which the Bank of China is dealing and is producing documents to suggest that people aren't routinely going to jail when documents are getting produced. Are you suggesting that the only time the Bank of China has produced documents in analogous cases is where there has been customer consent?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  SAPERSTEIN: Those are the only two examples I'm aware of, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: And then in those two instances the bank had customer consent. But it's an invidious position to put the bank in, to say you know, you should produce documents even though you don't have customer consent and you should hand those documents over and you run the risk of the penalties, and

the bank's position is, as we said, your Honor, patently unfair.

Now, if I may turn to the separate entity argument, because Mr. Weigel cited I believe one case which was the JW Oilfield case that was decided by Judge Castel earlier this year. And that case is distinctive because there the parties, the bank, didn't raise and did not brief the separate entity rule. It wasn't an issue. It wasn't an argument that the bank was making.

Second of all, I would say that JW Oilfield is in a minority of the cases with respect to the separate entity rule. I'll go through the cases that I think are the rule in a second. And third of all, even in JW Oilfield, even though the bank didn't raise the separate entity rule, and even though I think to the extent you could read it more broadly, the Court there said in the prejudgment context the separate entity rule is alive and well. And so even if you accept that case as binding on this Court, that it had been fully litigated, in the prejudgement context the Court acknowledged that the separate entity rule is still valid, something arguably so. But I think the rule is in this district that in the prejudgment and post-judgment context the separate entity rule is still good law.

Now, the Samsung decision I think is relevant to that, your Honor. Then, the Court said quite clearly that Koehler

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did not abrogate the separate entity rule for post-judgment enforcement. Now, Mr. Weigel says, well, the facts are different, the debtor wasn't present, there were less contacts with New York. That for purposes of the separate entity rule, that analysis is irrelevant. The Court specifically held there that the separate entity rule still applies. In fact, in Samsung, the petitioner there raised the same exact argument plaintiffs are raising here, that the bank is present in New York through its branch there and you could compel the branch to produce assets on a worldwide basis. The Court in Samsung rejected that argument and held that under the separate entity rule the branches of the bank are separate and the question is does the entity that is before the Court have the property, yes or no, or do they have control over the property and the Court held that the Bank of China, New York branch, did not have the property there and did not have control over the property located abroad.

THE COURT: Can I interrupt? So is your analysis sort of saying that the conclusion here would be different where it's being sought in connection with a preliminary injunction as opposed to in conjunction with a turnover order?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: No, your Honor. I think it's equally strong whether it's a preliminary injunction or post-judgment enforcement action. The separate entity rule is good law.

And, your Honor, there are a number of cases in which

courts in this district have affirmed the vitality of the separate entity rule. For example -- and we cite a number of these in our brief -- the Motorola case, which was a post-judgment case, held that you cannot force a branch to bring in property, a branch of a bank to bring separate assets in located abroad. Fidelity Partners is another case, Mr. Weigel argues that, he's probably familiar with that.

THE COURT: The point Mr. Weigel makes is the rationale for Koehler and the rationale for the separate entity doctrine doesn't apply here, the parade of horribles that drove the Court in that case doesn't really exist here because you've got the individual defendants who came into New York and did business, so there is jurisdiction over them vis-a-vis a judgment against them. So the concern that New York then is going to become just the location of battles like this where there's really no New York interest is not applicable here.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: I certainly think there are some real policy concerns there, your Honor, and for a bank here to be required to turn over property abroad will have some precedential value and profound policy implications. Indeed, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York branch, New York has submitted a brief in the Samsung litigation. The clearing house has submitted briefs.

THE COURT: Wait, a brief in connection with the decision that was rendered by Judge Solomon or an appeal of

that?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: In the underlying case with Judge Solomon.

But, your Honor, whether the debtors are present or not in New York is irrelevant for the separate entity property. It doesn't make a difference. I can make other arguments whether the debtor is in New York or not, but for purposes of the separate entity doctrine doesn't matter if the debtor is here or elsewhere. The separate entity doctrine says if you have a branch of a bank in the U.S. it is deemed to be a separate entity from branches elsewhere except in certain exceptions which don't apply here.

So we can talk about whether the debtors are here, but that's not relevant to the separate entity analysis. And there are a number of Courts that have held that in the prejudgment context and in the post-judgment context that you cannot force a bank to restrain and then turn over assets located abroad.

Indeed, just recently, Judge, I believe Patterson, issued the Levin decision, which was decided in January 2011 specifically reaffirming the validity of the separate entity. Judge Griesa in one of the Aurelius cases last year affirmed the vitality of the separate entity doctrine. We also cite the Lotus case in our briefs that confirm the vitality of the separate entity doctrine. The John Wiley case that we cite in our brief confirms that New York recognizes the separate entity

doctrine.

Koehler did not address the separate entity doctrine. It wasn't before the Court. The Court didn't speak to it. The Court did not specifically say the separate entity doctrine is bad law. The separate entity doctrine has been New York case law since I believe 1950 and it would be up to the Court of Appeals to overturn a well-established doctrine of New York law by silence and so the Court of Appeals simply did not consider, simply did not consider and certainly didn't rule upon the separate entity rule.

THE COURT: Is there any attempt that you're aware of, could you get the Court of Appeals to weigh in on this either by referral by way of the Second Circuit or through the normal appeals process within the state?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: What I can tell you, your Honor, is that certainly there are bank organizations including the IIB, as well as the clearing house, that is very actively submitting amicus briefs in this area. I can tell you right now my practice is busy with Koehler-related cases and we have, frankly, in my view another winter storm on our hands where we have a parade of Koehlerrelated litigation. I think, yes, at some point it's either going to go up to the circuit or the Court of Appeals.

THE COURT: But nothing now teed up for the circuit?

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Interestingly the plaintiffs cite the

Eitzen case. It was before the Second Circuit and plaintiffs cite it as an example of a Court, I believe it's Judge Hellerstein's decision, where the Court said the separate entity decision was overturned by Koehler. That decision was vacated just a couple of weeks ago by the U.S. Court of Appeals because the case had been rendered moot. So the Eitzen case is no longer good law, certainly has no precedential value and that case is not before the Second Circuit any more.

THE COURT: Mr. Weigel, do you want to respond on that point?

MR. WEIGEL: Yes. First off, your Honor, in this age of computers, we apologize because we missed the fact that the case was vacated. It was two weeks ago, I believe. It was an unreported decision and the Second Circuit's decision didn't somehow come up on Lexis or Nexis.

Why it was vacated is interesting. Judge Hellerstein ordered the Bank of India to comply with a restraining order and subpoena served upon it. The Bank of India objected below, fought through the whole process and then in its opening brief to the Second Circuit announced that it had searched all of its worldwide records and come to the conclusion that the debtor in that case did not have an account with them and so it was the plaintiff who had prevailed below who moved to have an appeal dismissed on grounds of mootness and it was dismissed.

THE COURT: The main point that I was asking about was

whether this is poised to be decided by the Second Circuit or whether the Second Circuit is in a position to make a referral to the New York State Court of Appeals.

MR. WEIGEL: Well, they did, your Honor, and that's the Koehler case. My colleague says that it was not decided, but in fact the very same banks submitted in the Koehler case arguments that Koehler should not come out the way it came out because of the separate entity doctrine. They argued that the separate entity doctrine prevented the Court in New York from ordering the Bank of Bermuda in Bermuda to produce a stock certificate. There was a strong dissent in Koehler, but the majority and the decision that's binding on all of us, held that in fact when there is jurisdiction over the bank in New York despite the separate entity doctrine, which was not mentioned at all —

THE COURT: It's not mentioned at all.

MR. WEIGEL: There's no indication that they thought that it was in any way an impediment to ordering, and it's not a doctrine out of the Court of Appeals, but there is no statement in Koehler that suggests that this Court should somehow consider the separate entity doctrine in deciding whether you can force a bank abroad to bring assets into the United States and — it's an interesting thing, because the Bank of China has never come in here and said that it is not subject to this Court's personal jurisdiction, like the Bank of

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Bermuda was subject to this Court's personal jurisdiction in that case. Whether you treat the New York branch as separate or not, I suppose we can go into some big inquiry, some metaphysical discussion --

THE COURT: That's why I don't think this question will be resolved by Koehler. I disagree with you. I think there's got to be a way to tee it up for the Second Circuit to say once and for all what it is to do in cases like this one, but I don't think the circuit is poised to do it any time soon.

MR. WEIGEL: If I could make a suggestion, your Honor. The question of whether this Court has the right to issue the injunction has been decided by the First Department, the Abuhamda case quite plainly says this Court could enjoin, in that case it was a bank in Jordan that had an office in New York, from allowing the assets to be dissipated. Supreme Court in First National City Bank overturned the Second Circuit decision applying the separate entity doctrine. Second Circuit applied the separate entity doctrine and said the Court in New York couldn't order, it was a branch in -- I want to say Uruquay. I may have the country wrong, but it was in South America. The Second Circuit said this Court could not enjoin Citibank from releasing funds in Uruguay, out of its branch in Uruquay, and the Supreme Court overturned that and said this Court has the power to restrain assets as long as you have power over the bank, which it did.

THE COURT: I get that. That's why I keep going back to whether there's a distinction to be made between restraining the assets and confirming that fact and producing documents, which is a little different. They are both the subject of the preliminary injunction, but they are certainly different injunctions, as it were.

MR. WEIGEL: Courts in this circuit, in this courtroom have routinely ordered banks to produce documents from abroad. It's not particularly unusual. They've done it even when parents own subs. The easiest case is when it's the same corporate entity. There's the five-factor test that your Honor knows.

THE COURT: Look, I get all that. I'm just, I think we keep going back to the different interests that are at issue here and I think the separate entity doctrine implicates some of those as well, a different set of interests as well.

I think I'm going to have to wrap this up. I'm going to reserve on this, but I do want to resolve this quickly.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: If I may, just a few points.

THE COURT: Very, very quickly, because I have a full house.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Your Honor, a couple of other points.

I just want to point out that Koehler is in apposite here.

There are several other points. I'll be brief. The first

point is Koehler involved a narrow set of facts and in that

case the judgment debtor pledged the securities to the bank as collateral. The bank itself had appeared before the Court.

There was no separate entity issue and the bank clearly had control over the assets at the time the restraining notice and petition were served.

THE COURT: No, I understand that.

MR. SAPERSTEIN: Okay. And the other point is, your Honor, it's perhaps an obvious one, I apologize. Koehler is simply silent and did not address because it did not need to address the conflict of the law issue that we have here. There was no conflict of law issue in Koehler and we have that issue squarely in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. I do get it. I appreciate the parties' preparation, it was obvious. It was interesting and I really do enjoy having good lawyers who know their subject as well as you both did and I want to thank those who didn't speak but who obviously had a role in preparing, you and ultimately me for today. So thanks. I will get back to you, I promise, quickly on this.

MR. WEIGEL: We will get that affidavit to you.

THE COURT: What do you think; by Tuesday?

MR. WEIGEL: If Tuesday is acceptable, we'll get it to you by Tuesday.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

(Adjourned)